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Durable, Yet Different: Monarchies in the Arab Spring
ANDRÉ BANK, THOMAS RICHTER and ANNA SUNIK
Abstract: Over three years into the Arab Spring, the Middle East is characterized by a striking
difference in durability between monarchies and republics. Beyond this difference, some
significant gaps within the group of the eight Middle East monarchies have so far been
overlooked. Drawing on the existing monarchy research, we first make the case that there
were three distinct types of durable monarchies prior to the Arab Spring. Confronted with
social and political crises, each type reacted differently to the challenges presented to them
after 2011. While five “rentier” and “dynastic” Gulf monarchies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE (United Arab Emirates)) mainly rely on material distribution and
family rule, the non-oil “linchpins” of Jordan and Morocco, attracting additional external
funds, undertook constitutional changes in an attempt at procedural legitimation. The
Sultanate of Oman, however, falls in between. This “linchtier” monarchy used modest
material cooptation, a selected personal reshuffling at the top of the regime as well as
targeted institutional adaptations. We illustrate our findings with similarly structured brief
case studies of the three prototypes of Qatar, Jordan and Oman.
Keywords: Middle East monarchies, Arab Spring, Jordan, Oman, Qatar
1 Introduction
Over three years into the Arab Spring, the political upheavals in the Middle East have led to the
breakdown of some authoritarian regimes and tested the durability of others. The eight authori-
tarian monarchies in the region, in particular, have proved strikingly durable, while a number
of heads of state in authoritarian republics (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya) have been
ousted. While the phenomenon of widespread monarchical durability is certainly relevant, it
tends to obscure the diversity that exists within the group of the eight Arab monarchies. After
all, the monarchies have experienced quite different challenges to their authoritarian rule in the
context of the Arab Spring. The Sunni Khalīfa monarchy in Bahrain has been under massive
pressure from the primarily Shīʿī majority and survived the crisis in February and March 2011
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only with the help of a mixture of repression, family loyalty and external military support from
other Gulf states as well as the acquiescence of the monarchy’s Western backers. More confined
compared with Bahrain but still remarkable, protests have taken place in Jordan, Kuwait and
Morocco, leading to unprecedented criticisms of the ruling monarchs. The monarchies in
Oman and Saudi Arabia have also experienced new forms of mobilization and activism in the
context of the Arab Spring, though with less intensity. Finally, the smaller Gulf monarchies in
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have remained largely calm.
This article focuses on the diverse strategies monarchical regimes have used to endure the
challenges kindled by the Arab Spring. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we make
the case that there were three distinct types of durable monarchies in the Middle East prior to
the Arab Spring: a first group consisting of the five Gulf monarchies of Bahrain, Kuwait,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, a second group consisting of the non-Gulf monarchies of
Jordan and Morocco and a third, hybrid category, represented by the Sultanate of Oman,
which blends some features with the other Gulf monarchies, for example, the oil wealth, and
others with Jordan and Morocco, for example, the non-dynastic character of political decision-
making. Our argument about three distinct types of monarchy supplements the commonly held
dualism in Middle East monarchy studies, which typically distinguishes the Gulf monarchies,
including Oman, from Jordan and Morocco.1
Next, we examine the cases of Jordan, Oman and Qatar in the context of the Arab Spring. The
aim of this section is to exemplify the character of each monarchical type and then to draw some
comparative conclusions about the monarchies’ durability after 2011. Our ﬁndings indicate that
the monarchies’ reactions to regime challenges during the Arab Spring resemble their politics
prior to the unrest. In other words, the differential interplay between the key aspects of external
support, rents and cooptation, family participation and legitimacy claims continues to be relevant.
At the same time, a number of monarchical reactions have been unprecedented. First, the Arab
Spring has led to extensive inter-monarchical cooperation through ﬁnancial, diplomatic, and
even military support. Second, there has been an extraordinary rise in state expenditures.
Third, the Arab Spring has provoked constitutional reforms. Not all of the monarchies are
equally engaged in all of these activities. While all of the oil rentier states increased state spend-
ing, constitutional reforms were limited to Jordan, Morocco, and to some extent Oman. Over three
years after the beginning of the Arab Spring, Arab monarchies are thus durable, yet different.
The ﬁnal section of the article discusses some lessons for the debate about the current state of
monarchies in the Middle East and their potential future(s).
2 Middle East monarchies before the Arab Spring
Studies of the remarkable durability of “ruling and reigning”2 authoritarian monarchies in the
Middle East have emphasized four central explanatory factors. First, all Middle East monarchies
have proﬁted from different types and levels of external support. Second, many monarchies have
access to large rents and are able to efﬁciently distribute them to main target groups, thereby
buying political loyalty. Third, Middle East monarchies have developed ways of including
1 Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies
(1999); Lucas, “Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern
Regime Type”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 36.1 (2004), pp. 103–19; Luciani, “Allocation
vs. Production State”, in The Rentier State, eds Beblawi and Luciani (1987), pp. 63–84; Barany, “Unrest and
State Response in Arab Monarchies”, Mediterranean Quarterly 24.2 (2013), pp. 5–38.
2 Anderson, “Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive”, in Middle East Monarchies: The
Challenge of Modernity, ed. Kostiner (2000), pp. 53–70.
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family and/or core elite members in political decision-making. And fourth, monarchies have con-
tinuously employed traditional, religious and procedural legitimacy claims to justify their rule vis-
à-vis broader parts of the population.
(1) Studies of the monarchies’ foreign support put on the center stage the external military
support of global powers like the USA or, historically, the UK as well as that of regional
powers, such as Iran or Saudi Arabia. There is serious doubt that Oman could have successfully
resisted the Dhufār rebellion of the 1970s or that the Kuwaitī monarchy could have made a pol-
itical return after the Iraqi invasion and occupation of August 1990 without the direct intervention
of external powers. But “softer” forms of external support are also highly relevant. Laurie Brand
and Sean Yom stress the importance of largely unconditional foreign aid for ﬁnancing the repres-
sion and cooptation of the domestic opposition, citing evidence from Jordan.3 Military aid and
arms deals are additional ways to cement the support of foreign powers like the USA, especially
with regard to the oil-rich monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula.4 At the same time, military aid
and arms deals do not obviate the need for domestic expenditures for funding the repression or
cooptation of the domestic opposition. Sean Yom and Gregory Gause have recently argued
that a combination of US “diplomatic assurances, economic grants and military interventions”
has decisively contributed to the monarchies’ recent durability.5 However, too excessive reliance
on external support can also delegitimize and thus destabilize a regime, as was the case with the
massive dependence on US security assistance by Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War in 1991. Ulti-
mately, US troops had to leave the country to avoid regime-threatening escalation.
(2) Rentier-state perspectives concentrate on the political economy of the so-called oil
monarchies.6 According to Giacomo Luciani, the durability of Middle East monarchies can be
explained by the continuous and high rent inﬂux, which results from the export of oil and
natural gas to world markets. It also relates to the rent payments made to loyal and geostrategi-
cally important clients, such as Jordan and Morocco, by external powers.7 The two approaches are
complementary, as the monarchies’ rent revenues based on exporting natural resources are sup-
plemented by external ﬁnancial support.8 Rent revenues, so the argument goes, are distributed
to key social groups in order to stabilize political rule. Rentierism tries to explain the consolida-
tion of monarchical rule by highlighting the continuous capacity of targeted state spending. The
“hard case” in this regard is the anti-Shah revolution of 1979 in Iran, where the monarchical
regime maintained an increasing level of rent income and state spending during the 1970s. Rev-
enues from the export of oil were also the dominant element of state funds in pre-revolutionary
Iraq during the 1950s, as well as in Libya one decade later.
(3) The third perspective is directed speciﬁcally against a narrow rentierist view. In his
groundbreaking volume, All in the Family, Michael Herb argues that the conditions for
3 Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (1995), pp. 81–3;
Yom, “Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy”, Journal of Democracy 20.4 (2009), p. 163.
4 Gause, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (1994), p. 127.
5 Yom and Gause, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On”, Journal of Democracy 23.3
(2012), pp. 74–88, p. 85; Frisch makes a similar argument, explaining monarchical durability in the
Middle East as a combination of the geostrategically important position of the respective state (external
dimension) and the maintenance of the broad regime coalition supporting the monarchy (internal dimension).
Frisch, “Why Monarchies Persist: Balancing between Internal and External Vulnerability”, Review of Inter-
national Studies 37.1 (2011), pp. 167–84.
6 Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production State”, pp. 63–84; Gause, Oil Monarchies.
7 Luciani, “Oil and Political Economy in International Relations of the Middle East”, in International
Relations of the Middle East, ed. Fawcett (2009), pp. 81–103.
8 Yom and Al-Momani, “The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability: Jordan in the
Post-Cold War Era”, Arab Studies Quarterly 30.1 (2008), pp. 39–60; Yom and Gause, “Resilient Royals”.
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monarchical durability can be best understood when the peculiarities of royal family politics are
taken into account, in particular regarding the inclusion or non-inclusion of parts of the family in
key decision-making institutions.9 Following Russell Lucas,10 Herb differentiates between
so-called “dynastic monarchies” and “linchpin” or “non-dynastic” monarchies. In the five dynas-
tic monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the ruling families determine political decision-making by
consensus. The family acts as a “ruling institution” and monopolizes the central positions in
both the administration and the security apparatus.11 In the linchpin monarchies of Jordan and
Morocco, as well as the collapsed monarchies of Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), Libya (1969) and
Iran (1979), the monarch — with the support of the respective royal court (al-dīwān al-malikī)
— maintains the balance between other influential institutions like the army or the parliament.
This is the crucial difference to dynastic monarchies: The linchpin around which other centers
of political power revolve is the monarch himself — and not the royal family. While generally
convincing, Herb’s perspective does not sufficiently substantiate the core argument that family
participation alone shields monarchies from breaking down. All dynastic monarchies are also
oil-rich, and thus it is impossible to separate family participation from high rent income and
large public spending schemes when discussing the question of durability. The analysis also
does not adequately explain the durability of the non-dynastic monarchies in Jordan and
Morocco. There, non-family-based mechanisms for elite cooptation must be employed,
drawing on the support of core groups, such as influential tribes, political parties or the military
and security apparatuses, more directly. The aim of core personnel reshufflings in and between
these core groups is to strengthen certain elite segments and to weaken others.12
(4) The fourth prominent perspective on monarchical durability addresses the use of speciﬁc
forms of legitimation.13 Oliver Schlumberger differentiates between different “core competences”
of legitimation for durability.14 Religious legitimacy claims are of particular importance in
Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia as they can be employed to delegitimize the Islamist opposi-
tion, in particular in times of political crises.15 Tradition and in particular tribal networks as well
as kinship symbols and networks can also be considered necessary (re)sources of legitimation, as
indicated by the continuing presence of primordial patterns of political exchange and communi-
cation among the Gulf monarchies.16 Material legitimation refers to the political–economic
dimension in the allocation or distribution of state resources — the key to ensuring the loyalty
of inﬂuential social groups. An additional component, which is mostly used in more liberalized
monarchies, can be called procedural legitimation. This entails the (re-)introduction of
9 Herb, All in the Family.
10 Lucas, “Monarchical Authoritarianism”.
11 Herb, All in the Family, p. 235.
12 Bank and Schlumberger, “Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform”, in Arab Elites.
Negotiating the Politics of Change, ed. Perthes (2004), pp. 35–60.
13 Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (1979); Schlumberger, “Opening Old Bottles in
Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East”, Middle East Critique 19.3
(2010), pp. 233–50.
14 Schlumberger, “Old Bottles”, pp. 239–46.
15 Krämer, “Good Counsel to the King: The Islamist Opposition in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco”,
in Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity, ed. Kostiner (2000), pp. 257–88. In Jordan, the
ruling Hashemite king as well as the Alaoui dynasty in Morocco can trace their descent to the Prophet
Muhammad. The Hashemites additionally style themselves as protectors of Al-Quds (Jerusalem), while
the Al Saud consider themselves the “guardians of the two holy sites” Mecca and Medina and promote a
strict conservative brand of Hanbali Islam (“Wahhabism”) as a state ideology.
16 Demmelhuber, “Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies: Making Family Dynasties Ready for the
21st Century”, Orient 52.1 (2011), pp. 6–10. On tribalism, see the classical study by Khoury and Kostiner
(eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (1990).
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parliamentary life, albeit controlled, as well as gradual top-down reforms ranging from consti-
tutions, laws concerning parties, media freedom or the introduction of elite-led reform commit-
tees, as in Morocco and Jordan in the 1980s.17 Similar use of participatory elements has been
displayed in the smaller Gulf monarchies. Here, the majālis or dīwāniyyā, by following
agreed-upon procedures, are also part of a legitimation of rule.18
Whereas the long-term durability of monarchies in the Middle East is mostly explained with
respect to one of the four above-mentioned aspects,19 explanations based of the combination of
various elements are rare. An exception to this is work by Sean Yom and Gregory Gause, who
have recently identiﬁed rentierism, foreign patronage and cross-cutting coalitions of popular
support as three central aspects to account formonarchical durability in the region.20Ourmacro-com-
parative analysis of all Middle East monarchies from 1945 to 2011 reveals three main groupings
among the eight survivingmonarchical states.21 InTable I, we summarize some of ourmainﬁndings.
Whereas rents and elaborate family participation are of overwhelming importance for explain-
ing monarchical durability in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the factors that
matter most for Jordan and Morocco are military and ﬁnancial support by external actors com-
bined with religious-traditional legitimacy claims. Oman falls between the two categories as
the sultan relies on a traditional legitimacy claim, which is supported by his close relationship
to the religious sector. At the same time, contrary to the “dynastic monarchies” of the Gulf, the
sultan rules without the support of close family members but still presides over a (albeit
poorer) rentier state. Oman does not ﬁt neatly into the rentier-dynastic monarchy category, but
neither is it a typical linchpin monarchy like Jordan or Morocco.
3 Comparing monarchies in the Arab Spring: Jordan, Oman and Qatar
Since early 2011, the Arab Spring has deﬁned politics in the Middle East’s eight authoritarian
monarchies. The three monarchies we present as case studies — Jordan, Oman and Qatar —
exemplify each of the three groups illustrated above: the poorer linchpin monarchies, the dynastic
rentier states in the Gulf and hybrid “linchtier” Oman. When faced with crisis and pressures to
reform, Jordan, Oman and Qatar turned to their established toolkits, which had been formed
and tested in previous periods. The rentiers raised public salaries and subsidies while continuing
to rely on extensive family networks. Linchpins Jordan and Morocco, only able to distribute
modest amounts of public spending and subsidies, launched constitutional and electoral reform
17 Albrecht and Schlumberger, “Waiting for Godot: Regime Change Without Democratization in the
Middle East”, International Political Science Review 25.4 (2004), pp. 371–92; Lust-Okar, Structuring Con-
flict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions (2005). On “committeisation”, see Bank,
“Rents, Cooptation, and Economized Discourse: Three Dimensions of Political Rule in Jordan, Morocco
and Syria”, Journal of Mediterranean Studies 14.1/2 (2004), pp. 155–79.
18 Demmelhuber, “Political Reform”. In addition, elections play an increasingly important role in many
Gulf monarchies since the Arab Spring, see Zaccara, “Comparing Elections in Gulf Cooperation Council
Countries after the Arab Spring: The United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait”, Journal of Arabian
Studies 3.1 (2013), pp. 80–101.
19 For example, Herb, All in the Family; Hudson, Arab Politics; Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production
State”; Luciani, “Oil and Political Economy”.
20 Yom and Gause, “Resilient Royals”.
21 Bank, Richter, and Sunik, “Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East: A Configurational
Comparison, 1945–2012”, Democratization online first (2013), pp. 1–22, which extensively covers cases of
broken-down monarchies to establish the conditions for both survival and breakdown. In contrast, this paper
provides a closer look at the strategies of survival and therefore only includes the durable monarchies in the
analysis.
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campaigns aimed at pacifying the opposition and boosting their procedural legitimacy. Oman
increased public spending substantially while initiating a modest constitutional reform process.
3.1 Jordan
The Arab Spring, the ﬁrst and foremost events in Egypt, immediately impacted the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, where King ʿAbd Allāh II has ruled since 1999. Following violent clashes
in the rural and tribal-dominated areas, “street politics” in Jordan increasingly shifted in
Table I: Middle East monarchies before 2011.
External support
Rents and
cooptationa
Family/elite
participation Legitimation
Jordan and
Morocco
Diplomatic and
ﬁnancial
support by
Western
powers
Semi-rentiers
dependent on
foreign aid;
modest state
spending schemes
No family
participation;
rotation of core
elite groups in
decision-making
Religious and traditional
forms of legitimation;
some participatory
elements via
parliaments
Oman Diplomatic,
military and
ﬁnancial
support by
Western
powers
Moderate rent
revenues from oil
and gas exports;
intermediate state
spending schemes
Marginal family
participation in
decision-
making; low
degree of elite
rotation
Traditional forms of
legitimation; informal
participatory elements,
for example,
proceduralism via
shūrā and majlis; few
formalized
participatory elements
via consultation
councils
Bahrain,
Kuwait,b
Qatar,
Saudi
Arabia and
the UAE
Diplomatic,
military and
ﬁnancial
support by
Western
powers
Moderate (Bahrain)
to high rent
revenues from oil
and gas exports
and extensive state
spending schemes
Extensive family
participation in
decision-making
Barely any religious form
of legitimation (except
for Saudi Arabia);
traditional and
informal participatory
elements, for example,
proceduralism via
shūrā, majlis and
dīwāniyyā; weak
formalized
participatory elements
a Our understanding of the rentier state goes beyond the classical deﬁnition by Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production State”,
where he deﬁnes the threshold of 40% of state revenues, which should originate from primary commodities in order to be
classiﬁed as a rentier state. More recent literature argues that rent abundance, that is the per capita value of available rent
revenues, is a better indicator of the distribute capacities of the state. See, for instance, Dunning, Crude Democracy:
Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (2008) and Basedau and Lay, “Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The
Ambigious Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict”, Journal of Peace Research 46.6 (2009),
pp. 757–6. Relying on data for the period between 1970 and 2010 provided by Haber and Menaldo, “Do Natural
Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse”, American Political Science Review 105.1
(2011), pp. 1–26, Oman had an average annual per capita income from hydrocarbons of $3,084, Bahrain of $3,848,
Saudi Arabia of $6,319, Kuwait of $18,035 and Qatar of $25,053. We are grateful to one reviewer for advising us to
be more precise on this issue.
b Kuwait— and to some extent also Bahrain— have a tradition of formalized participation tradition not unlike the linchpin
monarchies; however, the primary line of legitimation is the one based on cooptation through the redistribution of oil
profits, while tribal-traditional or formalized participatory legitimation is secondary.
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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January and February 2011 to the cities of Amman and al-Zarqāʾ. The urban Muslim Brother-
hood, which represents the traditional opposition in Jordan and advocates a constitutional mon-
archy with a real division of powers, gathered momentum. The Hashemite regime permitted
demonstrations to take place, but under a massive state security presence. Alongside the tra-
ditional opposition, the Youth of 24 March and the hịrāk emerged as new and overwhelmingly
Transjordanian movements during the spring of 2011. In the end, however, the protests in
Jordan did not achieve the intensity or breadth of those in many other states in the region.
The respective interplay of the four explanatory aspects of external support, rents and coopta-
tion, family and elite participation, and the regime’s changing legitimacy claims goes a long
way toward explaining why the Jordanian monarchy has thus far survived the uprisings of
the Arab Spring.
3.1.1 External support
For the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, the provision of external support has been a crucial
structural factor in explaining its durability ever since the establishment of the state in the
early 1920s. Long considered the “epitome of artiﬁciality”22 in the Middle East, Jordan lacks
basic resources, foremost minerals, water and food-stock. As a non-oil monarchy, the Hashemite
regime has tried to exploit Jordan’s geostrategic location in the midst of the Middle East, directly
bordering the conﬂict hotspots of Israel/Palestine, Iraq and, most recently, Syria. Jordan’s
location and the monarchy’s generally pro-Western outlook have been rewarded by substantial
external support in the forms of military and economic aid as well as diplomatic support, primar-
ily from the USA but also from different European states and Japan. Together with the transi-
tional republics Egypt and Tunisia and the pro-Western non-oil monarchy of Morocco, Jordan
has been included in the G8’s assistance package of $38 billion for 2011–13. Even though
Jordan will receive only a portion of this massive sum, its very inclusion in the “lucrative
club” testiﬁes to its crucial standing in Western geostrategic thinking vis-à-vis the Middle
East. Overall, the continuous and increasing external support coming from outside the region
has shielded the Hashemite monarchy from substantial and continuing criticism from within Jor-
danian society, and especially from within its traditional Transjordanian base. Jordan’s buffer
state position is furthermore important for regional actors, most notably Saudi Arabia and the
other GCC states, who also support their poorer neighbor. At the onset of the Arab Spring in
2011, both Jordan and Morocco were invited to join the GCC. The inter-monarchical support
to Jordan did not stop there, as the GCC states pledged to provide $5 billion of aid over a
period of ﬁve years.
3.1.2 Rents and cooptation
Even though Jordan does not enjoy considerable revenues from exporting natural resources, in
the context of the Arab Spring it has used state revenues to coopt crucial social support
groups. Early on, as events began to unfold, King ʿAbd Allāh II raised public sector wages,
hoping to minimize discontent within the state bureaucracy. Second, he decided to rescind pre-
viously announced subsidy cuts on fuel and cooking gas. These measures were aimed at pre-
venting social protests from spreading to poorer neighborhoods, including the countryside,
from which the traditional Hashemite support base hails. As a third part of his cooptation strat-
egy, King ʿAbd Allāh II has visited major tribal confederations since early 2011, promising
22 Krämer, “Good Counsel”.
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future investments and emphasizing their continued importance in monarchical Jordan.
Overall, the effects of the monarchy’s cooptation strategy in the context of the Arab Spring
have been inconclusive. While it has appeased members of the state bureaucracy, at least in
the short term, it has not prevented protests from emerging in the rural and tribal-dominated
countryside.
3.1.3 Family and elite participation
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been described as a linchpin monarchy,23 in which the
king — and not the royal family — rules and reigns. In Jordan, elite politics thus serve less to
produce consensus within the ruling family, for example, by rewarding certain sons or brothers
from a speciﬁc family line. Rather, the aim of core personnel reshufﬂings is to strengthen
certain elite segments and to weaken others.24 This pattern of elite politics has clearly been
at play in Jordan since the beginning of the Arab Spring, when King ʿAbd Allāh II accelerated
the personnel reshufflings, most strikingly by appointing four different prime ministers over
the course of two years. On 1 February 2011, as an early concession to the emerging
protest movement, he sacked the then prime minister Samīr al-Rifāʿī and replaced him with
Maʿrūf al-Bakhīt from the ʿAbbādī tribe, the largest Transjordanian confederation. As a
general, al-Bakhīt represented the security apparatus and his appointment signaled that substan-
tial political reform was not to be expected. After massive criticism for his conservatism, al-
Bakhīt resigned on 17 October 2011, and was succeeded by ʿAwn al-Khasạ̄wna a week later.
As a vice president of the International Court of Justice, al-Khasạ̄wna represented a more
liberal position. He initiated dialog forums with opposition groups. Though loyal to the
king, in the end al-Khasạ̄wna was considered politically too independent. He resigned in
early May 2012 and was succeeded by Fāyiz al-Tạrāwna, a conservative from a tribal
family in al-Karak, during whose term a new electoral law was drafted (June 2012). Al-
T ̣arāwna stayed as prime minister until 2 October 2012, before moving on to become the
head of the Royal Court (al-dīwān al-malikī). His successor was ʿAbd Allāh al-Nsūr, who
was tasked with organizing parliamentary elections on 23 January 2013. Al-Nsūr remained
prime minister even after the elections, which saw a landslide victory for pro-regime candi-
dates yet again. Taken together, Jordanian elite politics during the Arab Spring have
allowed King ʿAbd Allāh to divert responsibilities, when convenient, away from himself
and to the prime minister. In addition, he has rewarded different elite segments — tribal secur-
ity conservatives and more liberal reformers — and their respective networks, but has always
kept them in a precarious position.
3.1.4 Changing legitimacy claims
The Hashemite king in Jordan regularly employs traditional and religious tropes to legitimize
his rule. Learning from the example of Morocco under King Muhammad VI, King ʿAbd
Allāh II adopted constitutional reforms as a strategy for countering the protests in the first
months of 2011.25 On 14 August 2011, King ʿAbd Allāh II announced a total of forty-two
23 Herb, All in the Family; Lucas, “Monarchical Authoritarianism”.
24 Bank and Schlumberger, “Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform”.
25 Bank, “Jordan and Morocco: Pacification Through Constitutional Reform?”, in Protest, Revolt and
Regime Change in the Arab World: Actors, Challenges, Implications and Policy Options, ed. Asseburg
(2012), pp. 31–3.
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mostly minor amendments to the constitution of 1952, prepared by a commission he had
appointed himself. The central changes relate to the establishment of a constitutional court;
restrictions on the powers of the security courts, which had even recently been used
against opposition; independent election monitoring; and the right to freedom of
expression.26
3.2 Oman
In the Sultanate of Oman, where Sultan Qābūs bin Saʿīd Al Saʿīd has ruled since taking power
from his father in a palace coup during the summer of 1970, protestors took to the streets in
mid-January 2011 demanding higher wages and complaining about increasing levels of corrup-
tion among government officials. These protests, which started quite small, were spurred on by
events in other Arab countries, especially in Bahrain. Although the sheer numbers involved in
Oman’s protest movement never rose to the level of those in Egypt, Tunisia or Bahrain, part of
the movement, maybe for the first time in modern Omani history, challenged the uncontested
role of the sultan as the nation’s father.27 Regime responses to the comparatively modest first
wave of protests were hesitant, suggesting that the regime was taken by surprise. As with
Jordan, a specific combination of the four explanatory aspects accounts for the survival of the
sultan’s regime during the first three years of the Arab Spring.
3.2.1 External support
The Sultanate of Oman occupies an important geostrategic position. It faces the Arabian Sea and
the Gulf of Oman, which leads into the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial
international maritime shipping route, especially for oil. In the past, Oman regularly received
military aid from the USA and the UK and provided Western military forces access to its
harbors and airﬁelds.28 With plans underway to use Oman as a new hub for oil exports from
several Gulf states, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz via a range of new pipelines, its geostrategic
importance will further increase over the coming years. External support, especially from the
British, has been crucial for the survival of the Al Saʿīd family since the late nineteenth
century29 and was instrumental in building the modern monarchical state around Sultan
Qābūs in the early 1970s. British military forces proved decisive for the suppression of the
armed rebellion in Dhufār (southern province of Oman).30 During the Arab Spring, Oman
has remained crucial for Western interests in the region31 and the Omani military has continued
to buy high-tech weapons from the West.32 At the same time, Oman has benefited from the inter-
monarchical Marshall plan initiated by Saudi Arabia, which plans to provide Oman with about
$10 billion over the next decade.33
26 For the latest version of the Jordanian constitution, see www.representatives.jo/pdfcenter/others/cons.
pdf.
27 Valeri, “‘Qaboos Can Make Mistakes like Anybody Else’ — The Sultan of Oman De-Sacralized”,
Jadaliyya, 18 Nov. 2012.
28 Katzman, “Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy”, CRS Report for Congress (Dec. 2011).
29 Joyce, The Sultanate of Oman: A Twentieth Century History (1995).
30 Valeri, Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State (2009).
31 Kaplan, “Keep Your Eye on Oman”, Real Clear World, 30 May 2013.
32 Mohammed, “Kerry Visits Oman for Arms Deal, Talks on Syria, Mideast”, Reuters, 21 May 2013.
33 Ottaway and Muasher, “Arab Monarchies: Change for Reform, Yet Unmet”, The Carnegie Papers
(Dec. 2011), p. 18.
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3.2.2 Rents and cooptation
Oman does not possess the abundant hydrocarbon resources of most of the other Gulf monarchies
and should be considered a rentier state on a moderate level.34 Waves of modern state building,
including the construction of basic infrastructure and the creation of education and health systems,
began under the reign of Sultan Qābūs during the early 1970s and were entirely paid for by oil
money. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the main reactions of the Omani regime to the events of
the Arab Spring was an intensiﬁcation of large-scale public distribution. In February 2011, the
sultan declared an over 40% increase in the minimum wage, the creation of new unemployment
beneﬁts and an increase in monthly stipends for students. He also promised the creation of 50,000
new public sector positions and announced a new $2.6 billion package of infrastructural invest-
ments and additional beneﬁts.35 The cycle of increasing state spending has largely continued since
then. The minimum wage was increased again in early 2013. The creation of new state employ-
ment remains a high priority and social spending is poised to increase over the years to come.36
3.2.3 Family and elite participation
Even though about ﬁfty to sixty male descendants of Saʿīd bin Sultạn, who ruled from 1804 to
1856, are alive today, none occupies a core government position. Sultan Qābūs is the prime min-
ister and has directed the foreign ministry, the ministry of defense and the ministry of finance
since the early days of his reign. Qābūs is also the supreme commander of the defense forces
and the police.37 During past decades, there have only been a handful of key decision-makers
belonging to the wider royal family. Overall, core members of the Al Saʿīd family are very
much separated from politics, though they occupy a privileged social position. The regime
coopts core elites, members of important Sunni tribes, Ibadi families and influential merchant net-
works by giving them positions within cabinet and the bureaucracy. Similar to Jordan, the sultan
has reshuffled his cabinet several times since protests broke out in February 2011. The first reshuf-
fle was on 27 February 2011, and the second one between 5 March and 7 March 2011, sacking
some prominent cabinet figures like the long-time serving minister of national economy ʿAbd al-
Nabī Makkī, who has been blamed for abusing his office for private purposes by many of the
Omani protesters. The third cabinet reshuffling took place in February 2012, almost four
months after the election of the new majlis al-shūrā. In addition, there have been continuing
changes in high bureaucratic positions below the ministerial level.
3.2.4 Changing legitimacy claims
After Sultan Qābūs succeed his father in 1970, he established a range of new symbolic elements
representing his political power. The ultimate goal of this process was to create an image of unity
between him as the new monarch and the new state of Oman.38 For example, the day of Qābūs’
34 Bahrain is probably the only exception among these other Gulf monarchies revealing similar levels of
rentierism as Oman.
35 Ottaway and Muasher, “Arab Monarchies”, p. 18; Lucas and Richter, “Arbeitsmarktpolitik am Golf:
Herrschaftssicherung nach dem ‘Arabischen Frühling’”, GIGA Focus Nahost 12 (2012), pp. 1–8.
36 Dickinson, “A Calm Arab Summer Follows Oman’s Arab Spring— The National”, The National, 11
Feb. 2013.
37 Valeri, Le sultanat d’Oman: une révolution en trompe-l’œil (2007), p. 158, Katzman, “Oman”, p. 1.
38 Chatty, “Rituals of Royalty and the Elaboration of Ceremony in Oman: View from the Edge”, Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies 41.1 (2009), pp. 39–58, Eickelmann, “Kings and People: Oman’s
State Consultative Council”, The Middle East Journal 38.1 (1984), pp. 51–71.
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accession to the throne (23 July 1970) later became named Renaissance Day (ʿīd al-nahdạ), point-
ing to the beginning of the modern period for Oman. The conflation of the identity of the modern
Omani state with the image of the sultan, whose persona is omnipresent in the daily life of every
citizen, is the central pillar of Qābūs’ legitimation strategy. In addition to relying on this strong
symbolism, the sultan initiated a small but significant formalization of the traditional shūrā prin-
ciple in the late 1970s, which culminated in the establishment of the Consultative Council (majlis
al-shūrā) during the 1990s. While members of this council are elected, their power remains
restricted to making recommendations to the ruler.39 In 1996, Qābūs declared the creation of
the second chamber, the State Council (majlis al-dawla), which contains members personally
selected by the sultan from the core elite and previous high-level bureaucrats. Together, the
majlis al-shūrā and the majlis al-dawla constitute of Council of Oman (majlis ʿUmān).
In general, the initial events of the Omani Arab Spring in early 2011 did not considerably
change the regime’s legitimatory practices. Sultan Qābūs remains the father of the nation and
the grand modernizer, who maintains ﬁrm control even during extraordinary times. The only
noticeable moves were in the sphere of procedural legitimization. In October 2011, after the
majlis al-shūrā election, the sultan amended the Omani basic law to include the presidents of
the majlis al-shūrā and the majlis al-dawla as well as members of the Supreme Court in the
Defense Council, which is in charge of succession if the Al Saʿīd Family Council fails to
select the next sultan. The second procedural amendment relates to the majlis ʿUmān. Altogether,
forty-five new articles to the basic law were introduced. Some of the most significant changes
relate to the new right of the majlis al-shūrā to review the annual state budget, to question the
performance of selected ministers and to draft new legislative initiatives.40
3.3 Qatar
Qatar has been one of the few Middle East monarchies to remain almost completely unchallenged
during the Arab Spring. Therefore, large adjustments and reforms like those made by its monarch-
ical neighbors were not necessary. Qatar’s small size and comparatively homogenous citizen
population makes its politics even more personalized. The institution of the majālis, fora in
which Qatari citizens can voice their grievances and demands without the need to resort to
open public protest, together with Qatar’s enormous hydrocarbon-based wealth that it continu-
ously distributes to all citizens provide stability and predictability to daily politics even during
the tumultuous Arab Spring.
3.3.1 External support
The biggest change for Qatar since the beginning of the Arab Spring has been its foreign engage-
ment.41 In fact, in contrast to almost all of its neighbors, Qatar seemed to look at the upheavals in
the region as an opportunity rather than a threat. Before the Arab Spring, Qatar attempted to shape
its role as an important mediator.42 In 2011, Qatar for the ﬁrst time took an active stance for one
conﬂict party by supporting the rebels in Libya and leading the Arab League in calling for the
39 Valeri, Oman, p. 161.
40 Royal Decree 99/2011, www.mola.gov.om/maraseem/948/99-2011.pdf.
41 For a related argument on Saudi Arabia, see Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Oppor-
tunities and Challenges of Security”, Journal of Arabian Studies 2.2 (2012), pp. 143–56.
42 Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy”, The Middle East Journal 65.4 (2011), pp. 539–56;
Peterson, “Qatar and theWorld: Branding for a Micro-State”, The Middle East Journal 60.4 (2006), pp. 732–
48.
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establishment of a no-ﬂy zone. Qatar then participated in the NATO military operation Uniﬁed
Protector that decisively contributed to ending Gaddaﬁ’s regime. Beyond Libya, Qatar
widened its support of opposition movements in other Arab Spring countries, the most notably
by backing Islamist groups in the Syrian conﬂict.43 Together with Saudi Arabia, Qatar took
over the role as a donor and supporter state to post-revolutionary republics such as Egypt, for
whom Qatar until the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood-led regime in July 2013 was the
“biggest ﬁnancial backer”,44 and to weakened monarchies such as Jordan.
Qatar, however, also has strong relations with Western powers due to its strategic location and
its vast oil and gas resources. Although there is no immediate threat to Qatar, the tiny monarchy is
ﬁrmly entrenched in the regional security framework. The entanglement of the USA in the Gulf
region and its military presence in Qatar (a major share of which is paid for by the Qatari govern-
ment) act as a prevention against aggression from regional powers— mainly from Saudi Arabia,
but also from Iran. After Operation Desert Storm, Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement
with the USA in 1991 and currently bases the forward headquarters of the US Central Command
at Khūr al-ʿUdaid and the US Army at al-Sailiyya. The USA, the UK and France are the main arms
suppliers to the country.45 On the regional level, Qatar is also engaged in the GCC and gave at
least token support to the intervention of the GCC Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain in March
2011. The activist foreign policy, which has since subsided, signified Qatar’s perception of
being secure and stable.
3.3.2 Rents and cooptation
Qatar is the prototypical example of a rentier state. About 85% of the country’s export earnings
and 70% of government revenues are derived from oil and gas, accounting for more than 50%
of GDP. Qatar has the third largest proven natural gas reserves in the world and is currently the
wealthiest state in the world in terms of GDP per capita as well as among the top three
countries with the lowest unemployment rate.46 This allows the mini-state great leverage in
dealing with domestic and external matters. The attraction of the massive amount of US pres-
ence as well as the growing engagement in regional politics would not have been possible
otherwise. Whereas Jordan needs foreign ﬁnancial assistance to support the cooptation of all
relevant actors, Qatar uses its vast ﬁnancial resources to provide assistance to other states. It
also uses its resources to provide the overwhelming beneﬁts Qatari nationals enjoy, including
free health care and education, water, electricity and other utilities; every university graduate
also has a guaranteed civil service job and further beneﬁts await at marriage. In addition,
the overﬂowing state resources support all kinds of societal and charity organizations that
might otherwise have been created by independent civil society actors in part to challenge
the state’s control of political or semi-political activity.47 Domestic opposition is therefore prac-
tically nonexistent. Although that does not mean that all criticism is stiﬂed, most of it is
reserved for rather apolitical issues and therefore not threatening the regime. Cooptation is
43 Stephens, “Syrian Politics in Doha”, RUSI Analysis, 14 Nov. 2012.
44 Doherty and Taylor, “Qatar, Libya Give Egypt Five Million Dollar Boost Amid IMF Talks”, Reuters,
10 Apr. 2013.
45 Blanchard, “Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations”, CRS Report for Congress (June 2012), pp. 10–
12.
46 Dargin, “Qatar’s Natural Gas: The Foreign-Policy Driver”, Middle East Policy 14.3 (2007), pp. 136–
42; CIA, “Country Comparison: GDP — Per Capita (PPP)”, CIA World Factbook (2013).
47 Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar”, The Middle East Journal 63.3
(2009), pp. 401–20.
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further eased in Qatar by the fact that Qatari nationals amount to only about 15% of the overall
population while the rest consists of expatriates, mostly low-wage guest workers from South
Asian countries. As “low-status” jobs can thus be “outsourced”, it is easier to include practi-
cally every Qatari into the elite circle and guard against splits. Although no public protests
took place during the early phase of the Arab Spring, the Qatari government took preemptive
action by further raising the already high salaries and social beneﬁts of state employees at a cost
of $8.24 billion.48
3.3.3 Family and elite participation
Among the small Qatari population, however, there are naturally different levels of inclusion and
cooptation. As most concerns of Qatari citizens are taken care of by the regime and political
activity is either discouraged or illegal (as is the case with political parties), the ruling family
can monopolize the most crucial state posts with relatively minor resistance. The most important
state posts of emir, prime minister, minister of defense, minister of interior and minister of trade
are occupied by members of the Al Thānī family. Some even have more than one portfolio con-
currently; the former emir was at the same time the minister of defense and the former prime min-
ister was also the foreign minister,49 concentrating the actual executive power even more. Still,
important families like the Al ʿAttiyya and Al Kuwārī are also included in the cabinet and
other bodies. The elections for two-thirds of the national advisory council have already been post-
poned numerous times, last in 2013, so control will stay in the hands of the royal elite for the fore-
seeable future. Family rule has been further strengthened by the replacement of the Palestinian
management director of al-Jazeera, Wadạ̄h ̣Khanfar, with an Al Thānī family member.
3.3.4 Changing legitimacy claims
The Arab Spring did not change much in the domestic legitimatory strategy of the Qatari regime.
The reliance on output legitimacy was not hampered as the demand for oil and gas remained
stable and foreign policy remained a government prerogative. The perception of personal legiti-
macy and leadership plays an important role, however, as former Emir Ḥamad bin Khalīfa is still
highly popular in the small Gulf monarchy. After he ousted his father Khalīfa bin Ḥamad in 1995,
Qatar’s development skyrocketed. The new emir, together with his politically active wife,
Sheikha Mūza, quickly started on a modernization path. They pushed through education
reforms, created cultural programs, strengthened economic and political ties with regional and
global powers, and initiated a process of nation-branding on an international scale, one expression
of which is the successful bid for the 2022 FIFAWorld Championship. The emir and his wife also
intensiﬁed attempts to create a common Qatari national identity by establishing institutions fos-
tering tradition and Qatari cultural heritage.50 This formed a counterweight for the population to
the strong Western, in particular the USA, inﬂuence in the small Gulf state. The current support
for Islamist groups across the region is also often seen as a legitimizing strategy to counteract
potential Islamist opposition, which has however not (yet) emerged. In fact, the position of the
Al Thānī family seems so secure and stable that the emir gave up his highly personalized rule
48 Anon., “Qatar Hikes Salaries, Pensions for State Employees”, Arabian Business, 7 Sept. 2011.
49 The current Prime Minister, ʿAbd Allāh bin Nassir bin Khalifa Al Thānī, is simultaneously the minister
of interior, indicating a stepping back from the interventionist foreign policy of the previous government.
50 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (2012).
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and abdicated in favor of his son at the end of June 2013.51 This constitutes the ﬁrst time since
1960 that power was passed down the Al Thānī line without a palace coup.
3.4 Comparing continuities and changes
Apart from a number of striking developments, the reactions of Middle East monarchies to the
Arab Spring have mostly followed earlier patterns. Each group of monarchies used its accustomed
method of regime stabilization. The three examples discussed above quite clearly demonstrate this
continuity. Linchpin Jordan managed to extract additional funds and assistance from bothWestern
and regional backers while at the same time King ʿAbd Allāh II has increased his efforts in shuf-
fling the country’s political elite. Rentier Qatar, on the other hand, did little beyond increasing the
amount of government benefits to its citizens. “Linchtier” Oman fell in between. It increased gov-
ernment benefits from its own resources, attracted financial assistance from its monarchic neigh-
bors, and at the same time implemented selected changes to high-level state posts.
However, some new and remarkable developments were also signiﬁcant. The extent of inter-
monarchical support, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and newcomer Qatar, has reached unprece-
dented levels with the GCC states’ invitation to Jordan and Morocco to join the organization.
By contrast, Yemen, an actual GCC neighbor state, has been waiting for years to receive such
an invitation. Massive amounts of ﬁnancial assistance to poorer monarchies also signify a new-
found monarchical solidarity, although the culmination of that support was probably the interven-
tion of the GCC Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain.
Table II: Middle East monarchies post-Arab Spring.
External support
Rents and
cooptation
Family/elite
participation Legitimation
Jordan Diplomatic and ﬁnancial
support by Western
powers; recipient of
inter-monarchical
support (large loans)
No rents from oil
and gas exports;
some foreign
aid available;
small public
salary raises
No family
participation;
acceleration of
rotation of core
elite groups in
decision-making
Religious and traditional
forms of legitimation;
implementation of
constitutional and
electoral reforms
(procedural
legitimation)
Oman Diplomatic support by
Western powers.
inter-monarchical
support (GCC
member, recipient of
aid from Saudi
Arabia)
Moderate rent
revenues from
oil and gas
exports; public
salary and
social beneﬁts
raises
No extensive family
participation,
rotation of core
elites in decision-
making
Traditional forms of
legitimation; new
implementation of
minimal constitutional
reforms
Qatar Diplomatic support by
Western powers;
donor of inter-
monarchical support
(GCC members)
High rent revenues
from oil and
gas; exports;
large public
salary hikes
Extensive family
participation in
decision-making
remains
Traditional and religious
forms of legitimation;
proceduralism via
majlis
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
51 Anon., “Qatar’s Emir Announces Transfer of Power to Son Sheikh Tamim”, Al-Arabiya, 25 June
2013.
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Despite the massive inter-monarchical support, an additional mechanism was used by some of
the monarchies to counter the waves of protest: institutional reform. After a successful insti-
tutional reform process in Morocco, Jordan chose a similar path. Albeit limited, this extent of con-
stitutional reform is an unusual step for the Hashemite monarchy. The same goes for the Sultanate
of Oman. Due to the unprecedented attacks on Sultan Qābūs’ legitimacy, including a new dimen-
sion of direct criticism, the reforms, however minor in absolute terms, represent a new trend.
Thus, with a mix of new and tested methods linchpins, rentiers and “linchtiers” successfully
relied on their strongest suits in the face of regional crisis. Dynastic Gulf states intensiﬁed
rents-fueled cooptation and family rule; the two linchpin monarchies sought additional external
support and moved to strengthen procedural legitimacy through reforms; “linchtier” Oman
blended cooptation and the refortiﬁcation of legitimacy. Table II summarizes the changes and
continuities.
4 Conclusions: on the future(s) of monarchies
The durability of Arab monarchies during the Arab Spring might seem bafﬂing at ﬁrst, but can be
better understood by looking at the combination of some traditional key aspects of their rule.
What the recent developments also show is how different monarchies reacted differently to the
challenges presented to them. They all employed the same respective strategies that had
worked successfully in their own past. The Arab Spring, however, presented a new, serious chal-
lenge that was sometimes countered with new measures, whether in quality or in extent. Whereas
the oil-rich dynastic Gulf monarchies continued to rely on their extensive family rule and
their established distribution strategies, they also signiﬁcantly trumped up the amount of public
spending which proved as efﬁcient now as it had been in the past. In addition, they started to
actively support other, poorer monarchies with diplomatic and ﬁnancial assistance (Morocco,
Jordan and Oman) and in one case even with direct military support (Bahrain). Non-rentier
linchpins, which despite generous loans by the GCC states or Western actors do not possess
the means to buy off their opposition must rely on more modest public expenditures and
instead extend their efforts in changing strategies of elite cooptation as well as formalized consti-
tutional reforms.
On the one hand, these practices and policies have insulated the eight Arab monarchies from
existential threats and will in all likelihood continue to do so despite doomsday scenarios forecast-
ing the “coming collapse” of monarchical rule in the Middle East.52 On the other hand, this does
not mean that monarchies constitute a role model or viable alternative for other states. They may
be favored by the recent “zeitgeist”,53 serving as a foil to the negative example of unstable Middle
East republics, but there is no indication yet that their model of political rule is attractive beyond
their borders.
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